Came across this book at the Auckland City library and decided to find out how Wolsterstorff a top Christian philosopher argues that secular basis for inherent human rights do not work, and a theistic grounding for human rights work,
My interest was not so much on whether inherent human rights come from Enlightenment or earlier medieval/biblical sources, but solely on chapters 15/16 where he argued the above.
Why secular basis for human rights do not work?
- Kant locates the dignity of human beings in their ability to reason. But what about infants who have yet to develop this ability? Or Alzheimer patients who lost this capacity? Do they lose their human rights?
Or animals like dolphins and chimps that have a higher reasoning ability than an infant? Do they have rights? So it doesn't work.
- Then he discusses Dworkin's proposal which also argues for inherent human rights based on their dignity but that dignity is not found in any abilities they possess but rather, in the value we attach to the natural and human process that produced them.
Firstly there is the natural creative process: every human bring is the highest product of natural creation (therefore, special and should not be destroyed). Perhaps that refers to all the hardships and wonders of natural selection and natural history that went into producing this masterpiece called homo sapiens.
Secondly, every human is also the product of the "deliberate human creative force that we honor in honoring art" - this person is also a product of his culture, knowledge, experiences, language, history of the community as well as his/her own choices/creation/personal history that adds to his or her worth.
"The life of a single human organism commands respect and protection no matter in what form or shape, because of the complex creative investment it represents and because of our wonder at the divine or evolutionary processes that produce new lives from old ones, at the processes of nation and community and language through which a human being will come to absorb and continue hundreds of generations of cultures and forms of life and value, and, finally, when mental life has begun and flourishes, at the process of internal personal creation and judgement by which a person will make and remake himself, a mysterious, inescapable process in which we each participate, and which is therefore the most powerful and inevitable source of empathy and communion we have with every other creature who faces the same frightening challenge."
But again, Wolterstorff says the same problems apply, are the humans who are not mature, properly formed considered as "creative masterpieces"?
The last one he discussed was Gewirth's proposal, as far as i understand it, says in order to achieve my purposes (which I consider good), a necessary condition would be my freedom from coercion and well-being. Logically if I accept that I must have these then I must also accept that all purposive agents must equally have those rights. It is not a dignity-based approach, but similar to Kant, capacity-driven.
Ok, so the third proposal also face the same problems above. Therefore none of them works.
What about the theistic ground for human rights then? Can it overcome those same problems?
The author discusses the Genesis account of human beings being created in the image of God. Immediately we face a problem that theologians do not have a consensus on what that means. Is it the human capacity to reason, worship, speak, sexuality, have relationship with God etc?
After some exegetical explorations, we learn that whatever imago Dei means (this intrinsic dignity, set of capacities) should be bounded by the creation mandate God gave humans to rule and care for the animals and the rest of creation. But what are these inherent attributes that resemble God that shape or shaped by the creation mandate? The author didn't spell out any of them.
Not only that, then he goes on to say that neither the human resemblances to God nor the creation mandate to rule can ground natural human rights?! Because of course, they fall under the same problems... what about infants who do not yet acquired these nameless capacities? What about those with dementia who can't rule the earth? This is even harder than Kant's capacity to reason.
OK, does that mean a theistic grounding is unworkable as well?
Nope what we need for an adequate account of imago dei is the idea of human nature, When properly formed and functioning, humans have this nature (DNA of homo sapiens?) and not animals. So if we ground human rights on this human nature then it avoids the problem that some humans don't have it. It's not what they can do but what they are - humans. Now this becomes interesting because if you replace "image of God" with "human nature" you might end up with a secular basis after all.
But then, argued the author, this would not work as well because among those who possess this human nature/image of God, some are seriously lacking in those capacities. It's like a valuable Mercedes Benz that has a faulty engine. Surely it lacks value that inheres in the properly functioning one.
Conclusion after all these arguments: The image of God is not adequate all by itself, for grounding human rights. Gulp! (page 352)At this point I felt a bit short-changed... In the end, after struggling to comprehend some paragraphs half a dozen times, the theistic and secular grounding both seem to fail to account for these 'special cases'.
But all is not lost.
Wolterstorff then goes on to say: God loves His image-bearing creatures equally and permanently and this is what imparts intrinsic human dignity in a way that does not involve your abilities. This is a worth that is conferred, bestowed upon humans by that love. So no one can take it away...
But that got me thinking how is this option any better than Dworkin's secular sacredness: “The nerve of the sacred lies in the value we attach to a process or enterprise or project rather than to its results considered independently from how they were produced”.
The last one he discussed was Gewirth's proposal, as far as i understand it, says in order to achieve my purposes (which I consider good), a necessary condition would be my freedom from coercion and well-being. Logically if I accept that I must have these then I must also accept that all purposive agents must equally have those rights. It is not a dignity-based approach, but similar to Kant, capacity-driven.
Ok, so the third proposal also face the same problems above. Therefore none of them works.
What about the theistic ground for human rights then? Can it overcome those same problems?
The author discusses the Genesis account of human beings being created in the image of God. Immediately we face a problem that theologians do not have a consensus on what that means. Is it the human capacity to reason, worship, speak, sexuality, have relationship with God etc?
After some exegetical explorations, we learn that whatever imago Dei means (this intrinsic dignity, set of capacities) should be bounded by the creation mandate God gave humans to rule and care for the animals and the rest of creation. But what are these inherent attributes that resemble God that shape or shaped by the creation mandate? The author didn't spell out any of them.
Not only that, then he goes on to say that neither the human resemblances to God nor the creation mandate to rule can ground natural human rights?! Because of course, they fall under the same problems... what about infants who do not yet acquired these nameless capacities? What about those with dementia who can't rule the earth? This is even harder than Kant's capacity to reason.
OK, does that mean a theistic grounding is unworkable as well?
Nope what we need for an adequate account of imago dei is the idea of human nature, When properly formed and functioning, humans have this nature (DNA of homo sapiens?) and not animals. So if we ground human rights on this human nature then it avoids the problem that some humans don't have it. It's not what they can do but what they are - humans. Now this becomes interesting because if you replace "image of God" with "human nature" you might end up with a secular basis after all.
But then, argued the author, this would not work as well because among those who possess this human nature/image of God, some are seriously lacking in those capacities. It's like a valuable Mercedes Benz that has a faulty engine. Surely it lacks value that inheres in the properly functioning one.
Conclusion after all these arguments: The image of God is not adequate all by itself, for grounding human rights. Gulp! (page 352)At this point I felt a bit short-changed... In the end, after struggling to comprehend some paragraphs half a dozen times, the theistic and secular grounding both seem to fail to account for these 'special cases'.
But all is not lost.
Wolterstorff then goes on to say: God loves His image-bearing creatures equally and permanently and this is what imparts intrinsic human dignity in a way that does not involve your abilities. This is a worth that is conferred, bestowed upon humans by that love. So no one can take it away...
But that got me thinking how is this option any better than Dworkin's secular sacredness: “The nerve of the sacred lies in the value we attach to a process or enterprise or project rather than to its results considered independently from how they were produced”.
Dworkin's approach implies there are degrees of worth... a more developed human being with more natural/human investments may be more valuable than an undeveloped embryo. But it sounds like the same problem exists for the imago dei approach as well... Some malformed humans lack those qualities or capacities that inhere in the image of God, which the author seems to accept, means that they would be less valuable than the properly formed ones (unless you tag it with God's worth-bestowing love which makes all equally loved and valuable).
Well, Dworkin could say something similar i.e. it is "we" (humans) that attach a value to these homo sapiens who take part in this grand natural/human creative process. We bestow that worth to them...
Now Michael Perry, law professor would respond: But who is ‘we’ here? The Nazis? The Jews? The conspicuous problem with Dworkin’s secular argument for rights is that he assumes a consensus among human agents that does not exist and never has existed.
OK, that only means that some people do not recognize or dispute this inherent dignity. Couldn't the same be said about the worth-bestowing love of God in the theistic proposal? Someone somewhere (i.e. slave owners or Ku Klux Klan) would dispute that and say God does not love everyone equally.
If that makes a position unworkable, it seems that both alternatives are in the same boat. It is hard to see a clear winner here...
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